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 ABSTRACT  
 
 
 Malware is a serious threat to the security of the system. With the widespread use of the 
World Wide Web, there has been a tremendous increase in virus attacks, making computer 
security an essential for every personal computer. The rat-race between virus writers and 
detectors has led to improved viruses and detection techniques. In recent years, metamorphic 
malwares have posed serious challenge to anti-virus writers. Current signature based detection 
techniques, heuristic based techniques are not comprehensive solutions. A formidable solution to 
detection of metamorphic malware is void. This paper investigates the problem of malware 
detection, specifically metamorphic malwares. The paper proposes a statistical based detection 
technique as a viable candidate for comprehensive detection of metamorphic malwares. Related 
work, experimental results and analysis of the results are presented in this paper. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The history of computer viruses dates back to the early 1970s when ARPANET was in its 
early stages of adoption. Since then, computer virus infection has become one of the serious 
issues and posed serious threat to the integrity of computers as well as to the confidentiality of 
data contained within. A computer virus by definition is a program which when executed, 
reproduces and infects the computer, posing a threat to the integrity of the system. There are 
several types of computer virus namely Stealth viruses, computer worms, Trojan horses, 
Encrypted and polymorphic viruses, metamorphic viruses/malwares etc., A computer worm is a 
program, that replicates itself and spreads to other computers using the network to which the host 
machine is connected. Worms cause a lot of harm to the network by consuming the available 
bandwidth unlike viruses which affect files in a target host. 
 In recent years due to the widespread use of the Internet, rapid spread of virus has 
become possible. World Wide Web, instant messaging and file sharing systems are seen as active 
vulnerable nodes for spread of viruses. The nature of damage caused by viruses could be 
anywhere from deleting files, damaging programs to reformatting a hard disk. Some of the recent 
viruses aim at stealing personal information like passwords, email addresses, credit card 
information etc.,  
 Viruses are divided into two types based on the infection strategies namely Resident and 
Non-resident virus. A Non-resident virus has two modules namely finder and replication. The 
finder module is responsible for finding files to infect whereas the replication module is 
responsible for spreading the virus. In a resident virus, there is only a replication module which 
is binded to operating system calls. So, whenever the operating system performs a specified task 
like creating a file, the replication module gets activated.  
 The nature of computer viruses has evolved over the years and various anti-virus 
detection techniques have been developed to combat the spread of malicious viruses. There has 
been a lot of development both in virus detection and creating new kind of undetectable viruses. 
The most popular method of detecting virus is through signature detection. A virus signature is a 
specific sequence of bits that is unique to the virus program. It is like a fingerprint of the virus. 
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Signature is faster to detect and all it requires is a huge database of existing virus signatures 
updated periodically. However, the most recent form of viruses evades this form of detection. 
Such viruses are known as metamorphic virus/malware. The terms virus and malware are used 
interchangeably in different contexts. Metamorphic malware is a kind of malware which 
reproduces just like any other virus, but the new variant produced does not have the same 
signature. The new variant performs the same function as the parent variant but is not similar at 
the bit level. This implies that a single malware can produce thousands of variants. This implies 
that a single malware can produce the same malware with different fingerprints. Thus, the 
technique of signature detection fails. 
 This thesis aims at finding a new method for effective detection of metamorphic 
malware. Specifically, statistical analysis is being looked as the method of metamorphic malware 
detection. A malware produces a variant. A variant produces another variant malware that has the 
same functionality but different fingerprint. This variant produces another one and so on. 
However, there are certain common features amongst all the variants so produced. Firstly the 
functionality of the variants produced is the same, and secondly the functionality of the 
morphing engine. The morphing engine is responsible for generating different fingerprints of the 
malware. Since all variants of the malware have the same morphing engine, the side effect 
produced by the malware variants will be similar. This side effect is measured by calculating 
various statistics between the parent malware and the child variant that is produced. These 
statistics could include file size ratio, number of instructions and so on. It is anticipated that 
different malwares will possess different statistical characteristics which are unique to that 
particular malware. This statistical characteristic can be used as a signature to detect 
metamorphic malwares.  
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2. RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 Malware Types 
 
 The term Malware is derived from the words malicious and software. Malwares 
depending on their function gather information or damage the host system without the consent of 
the owner. Malware includes all of the following: viruses, computer worms, trojans, rootkits, 
spyware, adware and other malicious software. The types of malware and the various techniques 
used to evade detection have changed over the years. In recent years, there has been development 
of new types of malware that can evade signature detection techniques used by most anti-virus 
softwares. These malwares are broadly classified as Polymorphic and Metamorphic malware. 
2.1.1 Polymorphic Malware 
 
 Polymorphic malware like any other malware is a computer program that reproduces and 
causes harm to the computer. However, the variant produced by polymorphic malware constantly 
changes. This is done by filename changes, compression, encrypting with variable keys etc. The 
resulting variant has the same functionality as the parent malware. The earliest known kind of 
polymorphic virus was called 1260, written by Mark Washburn in 1990. The main body of a 
polymorphic malware consists of Malicious code and Encryption-Decryption code as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
    Figure 1: Anatomy of a polymorphic malware 
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 Polymorphic malware produce different variants of itself while keeping the inherent 
functionality as same. This is achieved through polymorphic code. Concept of polymorphic code 
is core to a polymorphic malware. It is a style of code that mutates keeping the original algorithm 
the same. [26] 
Start: 
GOTO Decryption_Code 
Encrypted: 
    ... 
    lots of encrypted code 
    ... 
Decryption_Code: 
    A = Encrypted 
Loop: 
    B = *A 
    B = B XOR CryptoKey 
    *A = B 
    A = A + 1 
    GOTO Loop IF NOT A = Decryption_Code 
    GOTO Encrypted 
 CryptoKey: 
    some_random_number 
 
Start: 
GOTO Decryption_Code 
Encrypted: 
    ... 
    lots of encrypted code 
    ... 
Decryption_Code: 
    C = C + 1 
    A = Encrypted 
Loop: 
    B = *A 
    C = 3214 * A 
    B = B XOR CryptoKey 
    *A = B 
    C = 1 
    C = A + B 
    A = A + 1 
    GOTO Loop IF NOT A = Decryption_Code 
    C = C^2 
    GOTO Encrypted 
 CryptoKey: 
    some_random_number 
Table 1: Polymorphic Code 
 The small section of polymorphic malware code containing the key generator and 
encryption-decryption module is responsible for morphing the malware and creating variants that 
do not have the same fingerprint.  
Figure 2: Execution Cycle of Polymorphic Malware 
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The problem of polymorphic malware is that the decryption block remained mostly the same in 
all the variants. The 10% of the code (as shown in Figure 1) can be used for as 
signature/fingerprint of the malware. Polymorphic malware is one stepping to a new generation 
of malwares now known as Metamorphic malware. A metamorphic virus magically creates 
variants that are entirely different in form and yet perform the same function. 
2.1.2 Metamorphic Malware 
 
 Metamorphic malware represent the next class of virus that can create an entirely new 
variant after reproduction. The new variant produced is in no-way similar to the original variant. 
Metamorphic malwares do not use encryption as most polymorphic malware. Instead 
metamorphic malwares reply on code obfuscation techniques. Since the metamorphic malwares 
have do not produce variants having same body, they easily evade signature based detection. 
Since, most current anti-virus softwares primarily use signature based detection, metamorphic 
malware currently are greatest threat. [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10] 
 Unlike, polymorphic malware, metamorphic malware contain a morphing engine. The 
morphing engine is responsible for obfuscating the whole malware. The body of a metamorphic 
malware can be broadly divided into two parts namely Morphing engine and Malicious code as 
shown in Figure 3.  
    Figure 3: Anatomy of a metamorphic malware 
 The first known simple metamorphic virus dates back to December 1998, when 
Win95/Regswap virus was created. In Regswap, register exchange was implemented. Thus, 
different variants of Regswap had same code but different registers. [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10] The 
following code shows different versions of Regswap with the common portion in bold. 
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   Figure 4: Variants of Win95/Regswap virus 
 One of the methods of detecting regswap type of virus is using a wildcard string search. 
Later, virus writers used permutation techniques for reordering subroutines. The BadBoy DOS 
virus family relied on subroutine reordering. With 8 subroutines, the BadBoy virus could create 
8! = 40320 different variants. Most of these viruses could be detected with search strings.  
     Figure 5: Module reordering 
 The Win32/Evol virus which appreared in 2000 embodies more complex metamorphism 
and permutation techniques. It contains a metamorphic engine. The following table shows the 
different variants of Win32/Evol Virus. The morphing engine of Win32/Evol inserts garbage 
instructions and uses simple code obfuscation techniques. [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10] Wild card based 
detection techniques cannot detect Win32/Evol variants.  
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     Figure 6: Win32/Evol Variants 
 The Morphing engine which constitutes 80% of the malware code, consists of various sub 
components namely Disassembler, Shrinker, Permuter, Expander, and Assembler[10]. 
    Figure 7: Parts of Metamorphic Engine 
 The disassembler is responsible of converting from machine language to assembly 
language. The engine then uses code obfuscation techniques and changes the original code into 
an equivalent code through code re-ordering, inserting garbage instruction, adding jump 
instructions etc. Obtained “code” is then permuted and shuffled using a permuter. Finally the 
machine code is generated using an assembler thus creating a new variant which has the same 
functionality but looks very much different than the parent[10]. 
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2.2 Code Obfuscation Techniques 
 
 Metamorphic malwares use code obfuscation techniques as opposed to encryption used 
by polymorphic viruses. Code obfuscation is a technique of deliberately making code hard to 
understand and read. The resulting code after obfuscation has the same functionality. There are a 
variety of code obfuscation techniques namely Garbage Code Insertion, Register Renaming, 
Subroutine Permutation, Code reordering and Equivalent code substitution.  
2.2.1 Garbage Code Insertion 
 
 In this type of obfuscation, several junk instructions are added to the program which does 
not affect the logic of the program. These instructions do not affect the outcome of the program. 
The instructions are namely XCHG, NOP, “MOV ax, ax”, “SUB ax 0” etc., These instructions 
make the malware look different. Also there could be blocks of code which are never 
called/executed. This is done in order to make it difficult for to understand the inner logic of the 
malware.  
Original Code After Garbage Insertion 
Hex   Opcodes Assembly 
51   push ecx 
50   push eax 
5B   pop ebx 
8D 4B 38  lea ecx, [ebx + 38h] 
50   push eax 
E8  00000000  call 0h 
5B   pop ebx 
83 C3 1C  add ebx, 1Ch 
FA   cli 
8B 2B   mov ebp, [ebx] 
5B   pop ebx 
 
Hex  Opcodes Assembly 
51   push ecx 
90   nop 
50   push eax 
5B   pop ebx 
8D 4B 38  lea ecx, [ebx + 38h] 
50   push eax 
90   nop 
E8 00000000  call 0h 
5B   pop ebx 
83 C3 1C  add ebx, 1Ch 
FA   cli 
90   nop 
8B 2B   mov ebp, [ebx] 
5B   pop ebx 
    Table 2 Garbage Code Insertion  
 As shown the table 4, the signature of malware changes from 5150 5B8D 4B38 50E8 
0000 0000 5B83 C31C FA8B 2B5B to 5190 505B 8D4B 3850 90E8 0000 0000 5B83 C31C 
FA90 8B2B 5B.However, garbage code insertion alone is not an effective method of code 
obfuscation. [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10] Virus detectors can use heuristics and threshold to detect viruses 
relying only on this method of obfuscation. 
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2.2.2 Register Renaming 
 
 In this type of obfuscation, either the name of the variables or the registers are changed. 
This results in different opcodes being generated. The RegSwap virus produces variants based on 
this principle.  
Original Code Code with Register renaming Obfuscation 
MOV EAX, [X] 
MOV EBX, [Y] 
ADD EAX, EBX 
MOV [X], EAX 
MOV ECX, [X] 
MOV EAX, [Y] 
ADD ECX, EAX 
MOV [X], ECX 
    Table 3: Register Renaming Obfuscation 
 Although the instruction set is same in both the cases, the opcodes are different. 
Detecting such kind of malware requires a wild card search algorithm that ignores register 
changes. Register renaming provides different memory traces for each variant. This makes it 
difficult for virus detectors. Semantically, the code is equivalent. [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10] Semantic 
based virus detectors are more useful in detecting malwares using this type of code obfuscation. 
Regswap : Variant 1  Regswap : Variant 2 
  
  Table 4: Regswap variants using register renaming code obfuscation  
 
2.2.3 Subroutine Permutation 
 
 In this type of code obfuscation the order in which the subroutines appear in the code is 
changed. This order is irrelevant and does not impact the functionality of the malware as the 
order in which a subroutine appears in the program is totally irrelevant and does not affect the 
execution of the program. As shown in Figure 4, the modules are re-ordered. For a malware 
having n modules, the total number of combinations is n! Subroutine permutation is a type of 
code re-ordering; however in this case the whole module is reordered rather than individual 
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instructions. Also some section of code inside a module could also be re-ordered [1, 2, 3, 8, 9]. 
Original Code Code with Subroutine permutation 
Function1: 
MOV EAX, [X] 
Function2: 
MOV EBX, [Y] 
Function3: 
ADD EAX, EBX 
MOV [X], EAX 
Function2: 
MOV EBX, [Y] 
Function1: 
MOV EAX, [X] 
Function3: 
ADD EAX, EBX 
MOV [X], EAX 
   Table 5: Subroutine permutation code obfuscation 
 Malwares employing substitution permutation type code obfuscation can be detected 
through signature detection. However, detectors using techniques such as Hidden Markov Model 
or Profile Hidden Markov Model where the sequence of the program or subroutines is important, 
this obfuscation technique could pose serious problems. [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10] In such cases, the code 
needs to be de-permutated resulting in different possible combinations needing to be tried out. 
2.2.4 Code Reordering through Jumps 
 
 Similar to Subroutine permutation, code reordering is a kind of code permutation. This 
technique uses the JMP instruction as the backbone for obfuscation. The JMP instruction is like a 
GOTO statement in C programming language. The execution of the program jumps to the 
position specified in the instruction. This helps in basically creating different permutations of the 
code while keeping the functionality constant. The number of additional JMP instructions added 
will be proportional to the number of lines that are re-ordered. Like register renaming, this 
obfuscation beats memory mapping based detection. Code reordering using jumps evades 
signature detection [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10]. 
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    Figure 8: Code reordering using Jumps 
2.2.5 Equivalent code substitution 
 This technique of code obfuscation relies on the fact that an operation can be done in 
many ways. This principle is fundamental to mathematics and also in Boolean circuits. An XOR 
gate as shown in Figure 7 has different variants. All variants are functionally the same, but 
appear different. [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10] This is one of the dangerous forms of code obfuscation as it 
completely changes the topology and quality of variants produced.  
 Figure 9: Three different variants of XOR. Functionally same, physically different  
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 This kind of code obfuscation technique evades most of the malware detection 
techniques. Behavior based malware detectors work best in this case as the functionality remains 
the same for all variants.  
Original Code Code with Equivalent code obfuscation 
MOV EAX, [X] 
MOV EBX, [Y] 
ADD EAX, EBX 
MOV [X], EAX 
XOR EAX, EAX 
ADD EAX, [X] 
ADD EAX, [Y] 
MOV [X], ECX 
    Table 6: Equivalent code obfuscation 
2.3 Existing Metamorphic Malware Detection techniques 
 
2.3.1 Signature based detection 
 
 Signature based detection is one of the most popular and effective way of detecting virus. 
A signature as the name suggests is an identification. It is like a person's fingerprint. It is used to 
identify a single virus or a family of virus. Signature based detectors need to update its list of 
signatures frequently. If a new virus is found, then the signatures present in the database would 
be of no use since the signature of the new virus is not available in the database. Although anti-
virus detectors do not completely rely on signatures, they also look into heuristics sometimes. 
However, signatures form a formidable percentage in the detection process. Signature detection 
is fast and simple. 
 Signatures detection is not effective against some polymorphic and most metamorphic 
viruses. Metamorphic malwares use a combination of various code obfuscation techniques 
making the resulting variant so similar to the parent malware. Since signature detection depends 
on a series of bits, each variant has a different set of bits. Storing signatures of each variant of a 
malware is practically not feasible since it increases the dictionary of the detector with 
unnecessary signatures.  
2.3.2 Heuristics based detection 
 
 Recent virus detectors use signature detection along with heuristics. This help in reducing 
the number of false alarms. Heuristics is partially dependent on the behavior of the target 
malware. Each virus is born with a purpose. Not all virus have the same purpose. The technique, 
methodology and the kinds of attacks used by each virus is unique of its kind. Heuristics sets 
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certain base rules. These rules are mostly essential for proper functioning of the system and 
maintain its stability along with data integrity. Since a virus aims at tarnishing one or many of 
these, heuristics help in detecting and preventing new viruses to some extent. 
 Operating system files, DLL files (in Windows Operating System), registry entries, 
networking are some of the important places which are prone to attack. If a file or program is 
found to be violating the rules of normal program behavior then that program can be suspected to 
be a virus.  
 Although Heuristics is promising, it cannot stand for itself. The number of false alarms 
raised is high. Heuristics is good when combined with another reliable detection technique. 
Heuristics can be used to support or augment results of other detection techniques. A virus coder 
can still write a virus that does not obey the rules in a heuristics and still cause considerable 
damage to the system. 
 
2.3.3 Behavioral based detection 
 
 Behavior based detection is a type of dynamic analysis techniques. In a dynamic analysis 
technique the malware under suspicion needs to be dynamically executed in a sand-box 
environment. In behavior based detection, the malware is executed and the behavior of the 
malware is analyzed in runtime. Whenever the behavior of the virus seems “bad”, it is flagged as 
virus and corrective action is taken. Behavior based detection requires “templates” of 
bad/suspicious behavior. The behavior of the malware becomes its signature. Thus behavior 
based detection technique is a kind of signature based detector except that the signature here is 
the functionality of the malware. Since most recent malwares use code obfuscation techniques, it 
is practically not possible to statically analyze the program's functionality. 
 Behavioral based detection would result in less false positives. It is more reliable. Virus 
has to be debugged in runtime. This detection mechanism requires templates of bad behavior 
which can be automatically created or updated. It requires a dynamic environment which 
emulates the operating system and yet not harm the system. Virtual machines can be used as test 
bed for running malwares.  
2.3.4 Semantic based detection 
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 This detection technique is based on static analysis. In static analysis, the malware is not 
executed. The malware code is used to determine the malicious nature of the code.  A signature is 
created based on the semantic property of the code. [25] 
Signature T = (IT, VT,CT) 
IT = Sequence of Instructions 
VT = Set of variables 
CT = Set of Symbolic constants. 
 
 Semantic based detection supports certain types of code obfuscation techniques such as 
Instruction reordering, Register renaming, Garbage Insertion. However, malwares implementing 
Instruction replacement and Equivalent code replacement can still evade semantic based 
detection. [25] 
 
2.3.5 Hidden Markov Model based detection 
 
In recent years, detection of metamorphic malware has been very much effective due to 
the application of Markov models to malware detection. Profile Hidden Markov Models 
(PHMM) is known for their success in determining relations between DNA and protein 
sequences. When applied for malware analysis it has been found that PHMM can effectively 
detect metamorphic malware. Although PHMM can detect malwares which are metamorphic, 
they still need a test data in order to train them. [1] Also, the process of filtering the data, 
disassembling them, training and scoring the whole dataset can be time consuming. 
 
2.3.6 Similarity Analysis 
 
Another method to detect malwares is through similarity analysis. A program is 
represented as some number of functions f, and each function contains some number of 
statements which are termed as vectors x and y. The total number of vectors for the same 
program P and for all functions f is kept same. Similarity analysis can be performed by using 
cosine similarity measure which is primarily used in text mining. In short, the maliciousness of a 
15 
 
code is estimated.[5] 
The following steps are involved in a typical similarity analysis based detection. The 
program executable is decompressed and disassembled. Each disassembled program represents a 
vector of functions. Each function is represented as an array of vector of functions. The similarity 
between the functions of a program P and P' is computed using cosine similarity measure or 
other methods. The value is them compared with the threshold value to determine if the given 
executable is malicious or not[5]. 
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3.0 PROPOSED METAMORPHIC MALWARE DETECTION TECHNIQUE 
 
3.1 Why Statistics? 
 
Although it is important to detect metamorphic malwares at the first hand, it is equally 
important that this detection is done at a reasonable speed, performance and accuracy. The above 
mentioned methods lack either one or all of these qualities. The main aim of the project is to use 
statistics as the key ingredient to detecting metamorphic malwares. Since extracting statistics 
from assembly code is very fast, speed and performance would not be an issue if this method 
succeeds. However, the accuracy of this mechanism must be at par with the above mentioned 
methodologies. 
  
3.2 Current Research 
  
 Statistical based malware detection is a new technique developed in the past couple of 
years. It is a fairly new domain in malware detection arena. Andrew Wallenstein et al [18] 
proposed that Statistics derived from code analysis of different variants of same malware can be 
used as a signature. This signature can then be used to detect metamorphic malwares. Statistical 
based malware detection is dynamic. So, the malware needs to be executed in a sand-box 
environment.  
 Statistical based detection does not look at one variant of malware. It looks at generations 
of variants of a single malware by executing them multiple times. The base version of malware is 
executed. This produces another variant. This variant is fed as input and another malware is 
produced and so on. Since malwares of same variant have the same morphing engine, the kind of 
code obfuscation produced will be similar. But this similarity is not clearly evident. It is hidden 
in the form of statistics. Applying statistical analysis over a generation of malware variants will 
help in developing a process for automatic signature generation for a class of malware.  
 An exhaustive list of statistics is extracted from each generation of malware variant. 
Some of statistics include file size increase, file size per instruction, garbage code metrics, 
compression etc. Not all of these statistics are necessary for all types of malware variants. This 
will lead to the development of a classifier based detection engine that will look into particular 
statistical values. A threshold value needs to be ascertained individually for each type of malware 
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family. These exhaustive statistics coupled with threshold values and classifier should help in 
comprehensively detecting metamorphic malwares.  
3.3 Proposed Method in detail 
 
The current research in malware detection goes under the following paradigm. The 
paradigm is to detect malware from normal executable. Since a malware employs the following 
techniques such as Garbage code Insertion, Code reordering, Register renaming, Alternative 
Instruction substitution, the current techniques highlight on the side effects that are produced due 
to these techniques.  
 
However, there is another paradigm which is ignored. Our proposed model is based on 
this paradigm. The proposed model is based on the paradigm of optimization. What is the 
difference between a normal executable and a malware? A normal executable is generated by a 
compiler. Thus, all the instructions that the compiler produces in EXE file is optimized. A 
malware file on the other hand is initially generated by a compiler. But, the next generations of 
the malware is not generated by the compiler. It is generated by the malware itself. Thus, it is not 
as optimized as a normal executable. Our aim is indirectly to find out how optimized a program 
is with respect to the normal programs and then decide if the program is malware or not. 
 
We disassemble the exe files of a large dataset preferably around five hundred or more 
executables. Once disassembled, statistics are extracted from them. Similarly a dataset of more 
than hundred different malware variants are disassembled and statistics are generated. A 
threshold value is found out which will help us in deciding whether an executable is malware or 
not. 
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4.0 DESIGN 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
 Traditionally viruses and other malicious programs are detected using various signature 
based methods and other heuristics. However, in case of metamorphic malwares, these 
techniques are ineffective. Thus a need for a new detection mechanism for detecting 
metamorphic malwares exists. The following project starts with the assumption that statistics can 
be used to detecting metamorphic malwares. Although the body of the malware changes, they are 
still generated by the same engine. Therefore, a common trait or pattern should exist amongst all 
variants of the malware no matter how different the variants are from one another. The proposed 
methodology tries to prove the assumption that statistics can be used as a tool to find this 
common trait or pattern visible in all variants of a family of malware. 
 The proposed methodology consists of 3 major components namely disassembler, 
statistics extractor and C4.5 classifier. They are described in detail in the following sections. 
 
4.2 Disassembler 
 
 A disassembler is a computer program which takes an executable as input and returns the 
assembly language code of it. Its function is exactly the opposite of an assembler program found 
in compilers. Converting into assembly language helps in getting an insight into the source code 
of the program. No matter in what language a program is written, once an executable is created, 
it can be converted into assembly source code using disassemblers.  
4.3 Statistics Extractor 
 
 The statistics extractor is the heart of the proposed detection methodology. This module 
takes the assembly code generated by a disassembler as input and analyzes the source code. It 
then gathers important statistics from this source code. This statistics finally help in deciding 
whether a given executable is malware or not.  
 The statistics extracted are detailed as below. The statistics are selected in a way so as to 
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counter act the code obfuscation techniques generally adopted by malware writers. 
 
1. Percentage of NOPs at the end of Sub-routine (PER_NOP_AT_END_SUB) 
 (100 * NOP instructions which are at the end of a sub-routine )   
 (Total number of assembly LOC) 
One of the common methods of code obfuscation employed by malware writers is Garbage Code 
insertion. In this type of obfuscation, certain instructions are inserted which do not affect the 
logic of the program. An NOP instruction is an example and is the most common and widely 
used instruction by malware writers. The following statistics finds out the percentage of NOP 
instructions which are present at the end of the sub-routine. The reason for using this statistics is 
that, traditionally NOPs are not frequently used in a legitimate exe. Now-a-days with the 
advancement of compiler optimization, the usage of NOP’s has decreased in legitimate 
executables. In addition, NOPs are generally found at the end of a sub-routine. In short, it means 
that an exe with higher concentration of NOPs at the end of subroutine is less likely to be a 
legitimate exe. 
2. Percentage of NOPs at Random (PER_NOP_AT_RANDOM) 
 (100 * NOP instructions which are NOT at the end of a sub-routine)  
 (total number of assembly LOC) 
This statistics gives the percentage of NOPs which are placed at random. This is a very powerful 
statistic for detecting malwares because metamorphic malware engines place NOPs at random. 
So, a metamorphic engine which heavily uses garbage code insertion should be easily captured 
by this statistic. 
3. JMP Instruction profile (JMP_PROFILE_ALL) 
 (100 * count of all 32 JMP instruction variants )  
 (Total number of assembly LOC) 
Another common method of code obfuscation is called code re-ordering. In this type of 
obfuscation the code of a subroutine is initially split. A JMP instruction is inserted in between to 
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join these two codes. Therefore, the logic of the code is not changed whereas the body of 
malware changes.  
The following statistic finds out how many times a JMP instruction is called with respect to the 
number of lines of assembly code. Dividing by number of lines of code helps in normalizing the 
statistic. This statistic helps in effectively finding out metamorphic malwares engines using code 
reordering. 
4. SHORT JMP Instruction profile (SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE) 
This is similar to the previous statistics, except that in this case the count is gathered for all JMP 
instructions using the SHORT profile. 
 (100 * count of all 32 JMP instruction variants using SHORT )  
(Total number of assembly LOC) 
 
5. SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL 
 [ (Total number of sub routines defined)  + (Total number of locations defined)  ] * 100  
 (Total number of assembly LOC) 
This set of statistics helps in detecting a kind of code obfuscation named Sub-routine reordering. 
In this case, the presence of sub-routines in the assembly code is physically changed from one 
place to another resulting in a different malware body. Locations are labels where a segment of 
code is defined. 
6. SUB_MINUS_CALL 
[ (total number of sub routines defined)  + (total number of locations defined)  
– (total number of CALL instructions) – (total number of all 32 variants of JMP instructions) ] * 
100    
÷ (Total number of assembly LOC) 
This statistic helps in detecting code obfuscation where dummy sub-routines are randomly added 
to the malware body. These subroutines are never called. The following statistics helps in finding 
out how if there are any sub-routines which are left dummy and never called. 
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4.4 C4.5 Classifier 
 
Once the statistics are extracted for normal and malware executables there is a need to 
develop a decision tree based on the statistical values obtained from test data. This decision tree 
is obtained using C4.5. C4.5 was originally developed by Ross Quinlan. It is an algorithm for 
generating decision trees. It is a statistical classifier.  
C4.5 builds decision trees based on information entropy. A test data contains a set of 
samples S= S1, S2…Sn Since it is training data, it is already classified into different classes C=C1, 
C2….Cn Using this data, C4.5 finds out attributes which effectively split the given sample data 
from one class to another. 
4.5 The Process 
 
 The whole process of the proposed methodology is described in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 10: Proposed Technique in detail 
 Initially a set of good exes are chosen. They are sent into a disassembler and assembly 
code is extracted from them. In addition, a set of previously chosen metamorphic malware 
samples are disassembled. Then, they are sent through the statistic extractor module which 
extracts the above mentioned statistics from assembly source code. The test data is then passed 
through a C4.5 classifier which gives out the decision tree.  
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 When a test exe is found, it is disassembled and passed through the statistic extractor. 
Then, the values obtained are matched to see, if it fits the decision tree of any existing malware 
family. If it fits, then the new test exe is termed as a variant of that malware, else it is declared 
benign. 
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5 TEST CASES 
5.1 Training the Classifier 
 
 C4.5 is a statistical classifier. In order to churn decision trees out of C4.5, it needs a 
sample data set to understand the way normal and malwares are classified. A clean Windows XP 
system was chosen and about 500 executables were randomly taken. These 500 executables 
included the standard windows operating system applications and some third party executables 
that come pre-installed with the system. These 500 executables were passed through the 
proposed system and statistics were extracted. The following figure gives the distribution of the 
training data for normal/genuine executables. 
 
Figure 11: Footprint of Normal/Genuine Executables Training data topology 
 
5.2 Next Generation Virus Construction Kit  
 
 NGVCK is a computer program which can be used to generate different kinds of 
metamorphic malware. It is one of the best known metamorphic malware generators. Initially 
100 variants of NGVCK are generated and 7 variants are picked at random. Similarly 500 normal 
exe from a clean windows xp operating system are taken. They form the test dataset for NGVCK 
malware. The test data is disassembled and passed through the statistic extractor. The following 
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figure gives the statistical distribution of test NGVCK data. 
 
Figure 12: Footprint of NGVCK Training data topology 
The test data set is passed through C4.5 classifier to generate a decision tree for NGVCK 
variants. The following tree is obtained. 
SUB_MINUS_CALL > 0.055 : normal (491.0) 
SUB_MINUS_CALL <= 0.055 : 
 |   SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE <= 9.333 : malware (7.0) 
 |   SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE > 9.333 : normal (18.0) 
Now, the remaining 93 variants of NGVCK were disassembled and statistics were extracted from 
them.  
 
Table 7: NGVCK Test Data results sample 
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Figure 13: Footprint of NGVCK Test data results and topology 
 
All of the 93 NGVCK variants had  
• SUB_MINUS_CALL <= 0.055 and 
• SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE <= 9.33 which is in consonance with the decision 
tree for NGVCK malware family variants.  
 
5.3 Virus Creation Lab (VCL)  
 
 Virus Creation Lab is a computer program which can be used to generate different kinds 
of metamorphic malware. Initially 9 variants of VCL are generated and 5 variants are picked at 
random. Similarly 500 normal exe from a clean windows xp operating system are taken. They 
form the test dataset for VCL malware. The test data is disassembled and passed through the 
statistic extractor. The following figure gives the statistical distribution of test VCL data. 
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Figure 14: Footprint of VCL Training data topology 
 
The test data set is passed through C4.5 classifier to generate a decision tree for VCL variants. 
The following tree is obtained. 
SUB_MINUS_CALL > 0.056 : normal (489.0) 
SUB_MINUS_CALL <= 0.056 : 
 |   SUB_MINUS_CALL <= -0.041 : malware (5.0) 
 |   SUB_MINUS_CALL > -0.041 : normal (20.0) 
Now, the remaining 4 variants of VCL were disassembled and statistics were extracted from 
them.  
 
Table 8: VCL Test Data results sample 
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Figure 15: Footprint of VCL Test data results and topology 
 
All of the 4 VCL variants had SUB_MINUS_CALL <= -0.041 which is in consonance with the 
decision tree for VCL malware family variants.  
 
5.4 G2 
 
 G2 is a computer program which can be used to generate different kinds of metamorphic 
malware. Initially 6 variants of G2 are generated and 3 variants are picked at random. Similarly 
500 normal exe from a clean windows xp operating system are taken. They form the test dataset 
for G2 malware. The test data is disassembled and passed through the statistic extractor. The 
following figure gives the statistical distribution of test G2 data. 
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Figure 16: G2 Training data topology 
The test data set is passed through C4.5 classifier to generate a decision tree for G2 variants. The 
following tree is obtained. 
SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL > 20 : normal (477.0) 
SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL <= 20 : 
  |   SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE <= 7.143 : malware (3.1/0.1) 
  |   SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE > 7.143 : normal (31.9/0.0) 
 
Now, the remaining 3 variants of G2 were disassembled and statistics were extracted from them.  
 
Table 9: G2 Test Data results sample 
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Figure17: G2 Test data results and topology 
 
All of the 3 G2 variants had SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL <= 20 and 
SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE <= 7.143 which is in consonance with the decision tree for G2 
malware family variants.  
5.5 MPCGEN (Mass Code Generator) 
 
 MPCGEN is a computer program which can be used to generate different kinds of 
metamorphic malware. Initially 20 variants of MPCGEN are generated and 5 variants are picked 
at random. Similarly 500 normal exe from a clean windows xp operating system are taken. They 
form the test dataset for MPCGEN malware. The test data is disassembled and passed through 
the statistic extractor. The following figure gives the statistical distribution of test MPCGEN 
data. 
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Figure18: MPCGEN Training data topology 
The test data set is passed through C4.5 classifier to generate a decision tree for MPCGEN 
variants. The following tree is obtained. 
SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL > 20: normal (477.0) 
SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL <= 20: 
    SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE > 19.054: normal (26.7) 
    SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE <= 19.054: 
        SUB_MINUS_CALL <= 0.116: malware (7.0) 
         SUB_MINUS_CALL > 0.116: normal (5.3/0.0) 
 
 
Now, the remaining 15 variants of G2 were disassembled and statistics were extracted from 
them.  
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Table 10: MPCGEN Test Data results sample 
 
Figure 19: MPCGEN Test data results and topology 
 
All of the 15 MPCGEN variants had SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL <= 19.054 and 
SUB_MINUS_CALL <= 0.116 which is in consonance with the decision tree for MPCGEN 
malware family variants. Table 10 shows the test data for all fifteen variants and Figure 18 shows 
the footprint of MPCGEN test data. 
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5.6 Win32/Zmist 
 
 The Win32/Zmist virus is a very complex metamorphic virus released in the year 2001. 
The abbreviation Zmist stands for Zombie Mistfall. Initially 3 variants of Zmist were found, out 
of which 2 were selected at random for training purposes. Similarly 500 normal exe from a clean 
windows xp operating system are taken. They form the test dataset for Zmist malware. The test 
data is disassembled and passed through the statistic extractor. The following figure gives the 
statistical distribution of test ZMIST data. 
 
Figure 20: ZMIST Training data topology 
 
 As seen above, the distribution of test data of ZMIST virus is very random and does not 
follow any pattern when compared to other malwares like that NGVCK, VCL, G2, and 
MPCGEN.  When the training data was fed to C4.5, it could not produce any decision tree of the 
given data. 
 This implies that the current statistics are not enough to capture ZMIST. The ZMIST 
virus used advanced code obfuscation like reversing of branch conditions, push/pop replacing 
register movement, encoding alternative opcodes, xor/sub and or/test interchanging and garbage 
code generation [13]. 
5.7 Malware Generators 
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 Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based detection of metamorphic malware has been very 
effective in recent years. Metamorphic malwares that are created by metamorphic engines have 
been easily detected using HMM. To evade this, malware generators have been developed which 
exploit any weakness present in HMM based detection technique [27].  
 The proposed statistic based malware detection technique was applied to one such 
malware generator designed to evade HMM based detection. The results are as follows: 
Testcase % detected # of variants detected Total # of variants in 
dataset 
Function30 73.5 139 190 
Function5 35.2 67 190 
Table 11: Results obtained for Malware Generator dataset 
 The above results implies that statistics based detection cannot be evaded by malware 
generators written specifically to evade HMM based detection. However, in order to achieve 
more accurate detection, a new set of statistics are to be discovered. 
 
Figure 21: function 30 test data results and topology 
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Figure 22: function 5 test data results and topology 
5.8 Cygwin DLL 
NGVCK executables are considered to have similar functionality as Cygwin DLL. There are 41 
different Cygwin files considered for the test data[28]. Experiment aims to find out if the 
proposed statistics based technique can differentiate between NGVCK and Cygwin executables. 
The decision tree for NGVCK malware based on statistical detection was obtained as:  
 
SUB_MINUS_CALL > 0.055 (normal) 
SUB_MINUS_CALL <= 0.055 
 SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE <= 9.333 (malware) 
 SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE > 9.333 (normal) 
 
As seen in the raw data presented below (Table 12) for all 41 Cygwin files SUB_MINUS_CALL 
has value greater than 0.055. Therefore Cygwin executables are detected as “normal” and not as 
NGVCK. 
PER_NOP_AT_END
_SUB 
PER_NOP_AT_RA
NDOM 
SHORT_BY_JMP_PR
OFILE 
JMP_PROFILE_
ALL 
SUB_ROUTINE_PROFIL
E_ALL 
SUB_MINUS_C
ALL 
100 0 6.557 4.108 30 0.19 
94 5 10.619 6.832 27 0.124 
100 0 21.525 8.17 25 0.131 
56 43 12.668 8.062 23 0.111 
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56 43 12.668 8.044 23 0.113 
100 0 20.329 8.635 25 0.128 
79 20 12.5 9.004 27 0.127 
100 0 24.395 8.496 25 0.134 
92 7 12.387 8.529 24 0.106 
90 9 16.216 8.37 26 0.136 
69 30 13.876 8.248 25 0.123 
100 0 23.26 7.991 23 0.116 
100 0 13.953 7.517 30 0.154 
100 0 20.539 8.81 25 0.124 
55 44 12.959 8.717 24 0.114 
100 0 23.819 7.903 23 0.12 
100 0 22.474 7.94 23 0.124 
54 45 13.118 8.63 24 0.114 
53 46 12.452 8.597 24 0.113 
53 46 12.334 8.632 24 0.112 
53 46 12.476 8.614 24 0.113 
53 46 12.287 8.644 24 0.111 
68 31 12.879 8.581 24 0.111 
90 10 14.925 5.801 23 0.116 
75 24 18.962 6.665 18 0.067 
56 43 12.616 8.719 24 0.113 
54 45 12.195 8.653 24 0.111 
53 46 13.321 8.798 24 0.111 
56 43 12.684 8.728 24 0.112 
54 45 13.869 8.803 24 0.112 
57 42 12.939 8.648 24 0.112 
76 23 18.708 6.677 17 0.064 
69 30 12.366 8.75 24 0.115 
94 5 15.683 8.61 25 0.117 
100 0 22.826 5.008 26 0.144 
54 45 14.338 8.62 24 0.112 
100 0 21.446 8.879 26 0.137 
100 0 20.957 9.068 26 0.13 
100 0 21.247 9.112 26 0.141 
100 0 20.69 8.908 26 0.137 
74 25 13.947 9.205 24 0.114 
Table 12: Cygwin DLL’s statistic values 
Next figure shows footprint of Cygwin DLLs test data.
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Figure 23: Footprint of Cygwin DLL test data 
5.9 Comparison with other antivirus softwares. 
 The proposed methodology was compared against leading anti-virus software available in 
the market. It was found that statistics based detection was comparable with leading antivirus 
softwares namely Symantec and Mcafee. However, it was found that the proposed statistics 
based detection was better than most other antivirus softwares available in the market. 
Antivirus NGVCK G2 MPCGEN VCL 
Avast N Y Y X 
AVG N Y Y Y 
Avira N Y Y N 
CA Antivirus N Y N N 
Proposed Methodology Y Y Y Y 
F-prot N Y Y N 
Symantec N Y Y Y 
McAfee N Y Y Y 
Table 13: Comparison against antivirus products in market 
It could be observed from the table that Symantec, and McAfee do not detect NGVCK. Both the 
softwares claim that they have solution for NGVCK. 
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5.10 Effect on varying the number of statistics. 
 In order to optimize and minimze the number of statistics that are captured, different 
testcases were conducted to check the error rate achieved by deleting some statistics. All the 6 
statistics were divided into 3 categories namely Garbage instruction detection statistics 
(PER_NOP_AT_END_SUB, PER_NOP_AT_RANDOM), Code reordering detection statistics 
(JMP_PROFILE_ALL and SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE) and subroutine permutation detection 
statistics (SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL and SUB_MINUS_CALL). 
 
Figure 24: Percentage of false positives on removing each category of statistics 
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6.0 Conclusion 
In this project, a new technique has been proposed for detecting metamorphic malwares 
based on statistics. It has been found that statistics based detection can be an effective tool in 
detecting metamorphic malwares.  
 All the four test malware variants such as NGVCK, VCL, G2 and MPCGEN family were 
detected using the proposed technique. A decision tree obtained on the basis of statistics, can act 
as a signature to a type of malware variants.  C4.5 has been used as the classifier for generating 
decision trees based on test data, thereby proving the versatility of C4.5.  
 The six statistics chosen (PER_NOP_AT_END_SUB, PER_NOP_AT_RANDOM, 
JMP_PROFILE_ALL, SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE, SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL and 
SUB_MINUS_CALL) counteract specific types of code obfuscation namely garbage code 
insertion, sub-routine permutation and code-reordering. If a malware uses a different type of 
code obfuscation technique, then appropriate statistics need to be developed to counteract those 
techniques, so as to detect them. 
McAfee, Symantec are observed to be identifying all the malwares except NGVCK. McAfee and 
Symantec claim that they have solution for NGVCK but results differ other way. McAfee and 
Symantec are more comprehensive softwares. Proposed technique has edge with respect to these 
two in the size of executables, and system resources required. 
 Statistics based detection is based on static analysis of assembly code instructions. It is 
light weight and easy to implement. The accuracy of the system depends on the quality of dis-
assembler. The higher the quality of dis-assembler, the accurate the whole system would be.  
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7.0 Future Work 
 
The accuracy of the proposed system depends on the statistics used. The statistics should be 
chosen in such as way so that they are mutually exclusive to each other. It would be interesting 
to develop a statistic generator module which helps in automatically identifying new statistics. 
Malware writers use various techniques which makes it hard to disassemble an exe. 
Therefore, considerable research is required for developing better dis-assemblers. 
Clustering of exe’s based on the obtained statistics would help in developing threshold 
values for each family of malware. It would be interesting to see the effect of using weighted 
statistics, on the accuracy of malware detection.  
The speed of malware detection using this technique needs to be investigated. With the help 
of proper heuristics, the speed of detection could be vastly improved. The accuracy of malware 
detection on combining statistics based malware detection with other existing techniques needs 
to be looked into. A good combination would be one with Anomaly based detection as it would 
give a chance to detect new malwares, as our proposed methodology will handle the variants of 
known malwares. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. NGVCK Testdata results 
 
JMP_PROFILE_ALL SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL SUB_MINUS_CALL 
5.993 11 0.004 
6.349 12 0.012 
7.184 13 0.01 
7.573 13 0.012 
6.695 12 0.006 
7.495 13 0.006 
6.715 12 0.015 
5.95 13 0.021 
6.589 13 0.019 
5.847 11 0.01 
7.753 12 0.002 
6.144 12 0.008 
5.361 12 0.016 
7.407 13 0.006 
6.193 12 0.016 
5.882 12 0.018 
6.857 13 0.015 
6.275 12 0.012 
5.986 12 0.018 
6.222 12 0.011 
5.932 12 0.015 
6.744 12 0.01 
5.242 12 0.02 
6.107 12 0.017 
6.653 13 0.012 
6.776 13 0.018 
6.167 12 0.011 
7.018 13 0.007 
7.917 13 0 
7.677 13 0.004 
5.917 12 0.012 
6.883 13 0.013 
5.945 12 0.011 
5.97 12 0.011 
6.731 13 0.019 
6.371 12 0.012 
7.157 13 0.018 
7.171 12 0.008 
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6.859 13 0.013 
6.364 12 0.015 
6.119 13 0.021 
6.479 12 0.011 
5.812 12 0.014 
6.54 13 0.015 
6.331 12 0.011 
7.392 14 0.016 
7.632 13 0.01 
6.77 12 0.006 
6.237 13 0.016 
6.366 12 0.008 
6.465 12 0.012 
6.939 12 0.008 
5.609 12 0.015 
5.947 12 0.011 
7.216 13 0.008 
6.549 13 0.016 
6.604 12 0.011 
6.992 13 0.011 
6.584 13 0.014 
6.993 12 0.012 
5.577 12 0.015 
5.95 12 0.012 
6.472 12 0.004 
7.054 13 0.012 
5.527 11 0.01 
6.723 13 0.013 
7.555 12 -0.002 
6.838 12 0.004 
7.356 12 0.004 
7.283 12 0.004 
5.472 12 0.019 
5.684 12 0.017 
6.703 13 0.014 
8.125 13 0.004 
7.602 13 0.006 
5.929 12 0.016 
5.684 12 0.017 
6.151 12 0.016 
6.794 13 0.017 
6.043 12 0.016 
6.055 13 0.022 
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7.113 12 0.006 
4.924 12 0.025 
5.943 12 0.014 
7.042 13 0.016 
6.522 12 0.008 
5.513 12 0.017 
6.25 12 0.011 
5.273 12 0.02 
5.985 12 0.019 
6.183 12 0.009 
6.426 12 0.01 
6.186 12 0.012 
 
Appendix B. VCL Testdata results 
 
JMP_PROFILE_ALL SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL SUB_MINUS_CALL 
5.183 11 -0.043 
15.425 16 -0.085 
6.498 12 -0.043 
9.063 12 -0.041 
 
Appendix C. G2 Testdata results 
 
SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE JMP_PROFILE_ALL SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL SUB_MINUS_CALL 
0 6.742 13 0.056 
7.143 5.469 13 0.062 
7.143 5.882 13 0.063 
 
Appendix D. MPCGEN Testdata results 
 
SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE JMP_PROFILE_ALL SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL SUB_MINUS_CALL 
9.091 6.509 15 0.065 
7.143 5.833 15 0.088 
8.333 9.756 15 0.033 
0 7.303 14 0.051 
0 5.164 15 0.085 
6.25 5.556 14 0.08 
17.647 6.071 16 0.075 
8.333 8.108 14 0.041 
6.25 6.426 14 0.072 
0 5.34 15 0.078 
17.647 6.967 15 0.061 
8.333 8.108 14 0.041 
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8.333 6.091 15 0.066 
18.75 7.805 16 0.059 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E. Source Code 
 
/******************  AssemblyParser.java  **************************/ 
import java.io.BufferedReader; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException; 
import java.io.FileReader; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.util.HashMap; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import java.util.Map; 
import java.util.Set; 
import java.util.regex.Matcher; 
import java.util.regex.Pattern; 
 
 
public class AssemblyParser  
{ 
 
 HashMap<String, Integer> instructionSet = new HashMap<String, Integer>(); 
 Integer followedByNOPOrEndSub = 0; 
 Integer followedByOtherIns = 0; 
 public AssemblyParser() 
 { 
  //Initialize the 8086 instructions into a hashmap 
  initialize8086InstructionSet(); 
 } 
  
  
 private void initialize8086InstructionSet()  
 { 
  //Reads 8086-config.ini and initializes each 8086 instruction 
     File file = new File("8086-config.ini"); 
     StringBuffer contents = new StringBuffer(); 
     BufferedReader reader = null; 
  
     try 
     { 
         reader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(file)); 
         String text = null; 
  
         // repeat until all lines is read 
         while ((text = reader.readLine()) != null) 
         { 
       instructionSet.put(text, 0); 
      } 
     }  
     catch (Exception e) 
     { 
         e.printStackTrace(); 
     }  
     finally 
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     { 
         try 
         { 
             if (reader != null) 
             { 
                 reader.close(); 
             } 
         }  
         catch (Exception e) 
         { 
             e.printStackTrace(); 
         } 
     } 
      
   
 } 
 
 
 public void extractPrimaryStats(String pathToFile)  
 { 
  //The main method which reads an input file and generates statistics out 
of it. 
  try  
  { 
      BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(pathToFile)); 
      String eachLineAsStr; 
      Boolean NOPFlagRaised = false; 
      while ((eachLineAsStr = in.readLine()) != null)  
      { 
       //String[] tokenArr1 = eachLineAsStr.split(" "); 
       //String[] tokenArr = eachLineAsStr.split("\\t"); 
       //System.out.println(eachLineAsStr); 
       String[] tokenArr = eachLineAsStr.split(" "); 
        
       /* 
       Matcher m; 
       m = Pattern.compile(".*ADD 
.*,[^(\\d*D)(.*H)(\\d*B)(\\w*^\\w)]").matcher(eachLineAsStr.toUpperCase()); 
       if (m.find()) 
       { 
        System.out.println("FOUND:" + eachLineAsStr); 
       } 
       */ 
       Matcher m; 
       m = 
Pattern.compile(".*\\sSHORT\\s.*").matcher(eachLineAsStr.toUpperCase()); 
       if (m.find()) 
       { 
        //instructionSet.put("SHORT", 
instructionSet.get("SHORT")+1); 
       } 
          m = null; 
       //Pattern matching for loc_XXXXX or sub_XXXXX: 
                     
          { 
         
         
        m = 
Pattern.compile("LOC_.*").matcher(eachLineAsStr.toUpperCase()); 
        if (m.find() && 
eachLineAsStr.trim().toUpperCase().startsWith("LOC")) 
        { 
         instructionSet.put("LOC_ROUTINE", 
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instructionSet.get("LOC_ROUTINE")+1); 
        } 
         
        m = null; 
        m = 
Pattern.compile("SUB_.*:").matcher(eachLineAsStr.trim().toUpperCase()); 
        if (m.find() &&  
eachLineAsStr.trim().toUpperCase().startsWith("SUB")) 
        { 
         instructionSet.put("SUB_ROUTINE", 
instructionSet.get("SUB_ROUTINE")+1); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
         m = null; 
         m = 
Pattern.compile(".*:").matcher(eachLineAsStr.trim().toUpperCase()); 
         if (m.find()) 
         { 
          instructionSet.put("SUB_ROUTINE", 
instructionSet.get("SUB_ROUTINE")+1); 
         } 
        } 
          } 
           
           
     
          for (int i = 0; i < tokenArr.length; i++) 
          { 
            
           //System.out.println(tokenArr[i].trim()); 
           if ((tokenArr[i].trim().length() > 1)) 
           { 
            if 
(isAnInstruction(tokenArr[i].trim().toUpperCase())) 
            { 
            
 //instructionSet.put(tokenArr[i].trim().toUpperCase(), 
instructionSet.get(tokenArr[i].trim().toUpperCase())+1); 
             if (NOPFlagRaised) 
             { 
             
 //System.out.println(tokenArr[i].trim()); 
              if 
(tokenArr[i].trim().toUpperCase().equalsIgnoreCase("NOP")) 
              { 
               //System.out.println("other43"); 
               followedByNOPOrEndSub++; 
              } 
              else 
              { 
               //System.out.println("other"); 
               followedByOtherIns++; 
              } 
              NOPFlagRaised = false; 
             } 
             if 
(tokenArr[i].trim().toUpperCase().equalsIgnoreCase("NOP")) 
             { 
              //System.out.println("found " + 
eachLineAsStr); 
              NOPFlagRaised = true; 
              i = tokenArr.length+1; 
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             } 
            } 
            else 
            { 
             if (NOPFlagRaised) 
             { 
             
 //System.out.println("here2"+tokenArr[i].trim()); 
              followedByNOPOrEndSub++; 
              NOPFlagRaised = false; 
             } 
              
            } 
           } 
           else 
           { 
            if (NOPFlagRaised) 
            { 
             //System.out.println("here5"); 
             followedByNOPOrEndSub++; 
             NOPFlagRaised = false; 
            } 
             
           } 
          } 
           
       if (tokenArr.length == 0) 
       { 
           if (NOPFlagRaised) 
           { 
            //System.out.println("here7"); 
            followedByNOPOrEndSub++; 
            NOPFlagRaised = false; 
           }         
       } 
      } 
      in.close(); 
  }  
  catch (IOException e)  
  { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 private boolean isAnInstruction(String testStr) { 
  // Checks to see if the given token is an instruction or not. 
   
  String[] tokenArr = testStr.split("\\t"); 
  Boolean isFoundFlag = false; 
  if (tokenArr.length > 0) 
  { 
   for (int k=0; k<tokenArr.length; k++) 
   { 
    if (instructionSet.containsKey(tokenArr[k])) 
    { 
     instructionSet.put(tokenArr[k].trim().toUpperCase(), 
instructionSet.get(tokenArr[k].trim().toUpperCase())+1); 
     k = tokenArr.length+1; 
     isFoundFlag = true; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  return isFoundFlag; 
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 } 
 
 
 public int returnStatsFor(String ins) 
 { 
  // Returns the statistics count for a particular instruction  
  return instructionSet.get(ins.toUpperCase()); 
 } 
 
 public double returnJumpProfile() 
 { 
  // Returns the statistics of all the JMP variants combined. 
  double jmpInsCounter = 0.0; 
  jmpInsCounter +=  
  instructionSet.get("JA")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JAE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JB")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JBE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JC")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JCXZ")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JG")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JGE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JL")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JLE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNA")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNAE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNB")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNBE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNC")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNG")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNGE")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNL")+ 
  instructionSet.get("JNLE")+   
  instructionSet.get("JNO")+   
  instructionSet.get("JNP")+   
  instructionSet.get("JNS")+   
  instructionSet.get("JO")+   
  instructionSet.get("JP")+   
  instructionSet.get("JPE")+   
  instructionSet.get("JPO")+   
  instructionSet.get("JS")+   
  instructionSet.get("JZ")+   
  instructionSet.get("JCXZ")+   
  instructionSet.get("JECXZ")+   
  instructionSet.get("JMP");   
   
  return jmpInsCounter; 
 } 
   
 public Integer getFollowedByNOPOrEndSub() { 
  return followedByNOPOrEndSub; 
 } 
 
 
 public void setFollowedByNOPOrEndSub(Integer followedByNOPOrEndSub) { 
  this.followedByNOPOrEndSub = followedByNOPOrEndSub; 
 } 
 
 
 public Integer getFollowedByOtherIns() { 
  return followedByOtherIns; 
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 } 
 
 
 public void setFollowedByOtherIns(Integer followedByOtherIns) { 
  this.followedByOtherIns = followedByOtherIns; 
 } 
 
 
 public int returnNumASMLoc() 
 { 
  // Returns the total number of Assembly lines of code 
  int numASMLoc = 0; 
     Set entries = instructionSet.entrySet(); 
     Iterator it = entries.iterator(); 
     while (it.hasNext())  
     { 
       Map.Entry<String, Integer> entry = (Map.Entry) it.next(); 
      // if (entry.getValue() > 0) 
       { 
        numASMLoc += entry.getValue(); 
       } 
     } 
   
     return numASMLoc; 
 } 
 public void printAllStats(int mode) 
 { 
  //Method to print all statistics 
   
     // List the entries using entrySet() 
     Set entries = instructionSet.entrySet(); 
     Iterator it = entries.iterator(); 
     while (it.hasNext())  
     { 
       Map.Entry<String, Integer> entry = (Map.Entry) it.next(); 
      // if (entry.getValue() > 0) 
       { 
        if (mode == 0) 
        { 
         System.out.println(entry.getKey());   
        } 
        if (mode == 1) 
        { 
         System.out.println(entry.getValue()); 
        } 
        if (mode == 2) 
        { 
         System.out.println(entry.getKey() + "," + entry.getValue());   
        }         
         
       } 
     } 
 } 
  
} 
/***************** ASMFileFilter.java ***********************/ 
 
import java.io.*; 
 
public class ASMFileFilter implements FilenameFilter 
{ 
 public boolean accept(File dir, String name)  
 {  
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  // Returns a list of files in the current directory that end with .asm 
extension. 
  return name.endsWith(".asm");  
 }  
} 
/***************** ExeFileFilter.java ***********************/ 
import java.io.*; 
 
public class ExeFileFilter implements FilenameFilter 
{ 
 public boolean accept(File dir, String name)  
 {  
  //Return all files in the current directory that end with .EXE extension. 
  return name.endsWith(".exe");  
 }  
} 
/***************** StatisticsManager.java ***********************/ 
 
import java.io.BufferedWriter; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileWriter; 
import java.text.DecimalFormat; 
import java.util.HashMap; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import java.util.Map; 
import java.util.Scanner; 
 
 
public class StatisticsManager  
{ 
  
 /** 
  * @param args 
  */ 
 public static void main(String[] args)  
 { 
  // Statistics Manager is the umbrella class that takes care of generating 
the statistics  
  // from EXE's 
   
  Scanner scanner = new Scanner(System.in); 
  System.out.print("Run Test [malware/normal] : "); 
  String testType = scanner.nextLine(); 
  System.out.print("Path : "); 
  File rootASMDir = null; 
  rootASMDir = new File(scanner.nextLine()); 
  System.out.print("File name Suffix : "); 
  String fileSuffix = scanner.nextLine(); 
  System.out.print("Extract ASM from EXE's [Y/N] : "); 
  Boolean shouldExtractEXE = false; 
  shouldExtractEXE = (scanner.nextLine().trim().equalsIgnoreCase("Y")) ? 
true : false; 
  System.out.print("Generate Multiple versions from NGVCK [Y/N] : "); 
  Boolean shouldGenMulNGVCK = false; 
  shouldGenMulNGVCK = (scanner.nextLine().trim().equalsIgnoreCase("Y")) ? 
true : false; 
   
  //ExeFileFilter onlyEXE = new ExeFileFilter(); 
  //UtilityManager.print(onlyEXEArr); 
   
  // uncomment to extract asm code from all exe's in computer 
  if (shouldExtractEXE) 
  { 
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   File rootDir = new File("C:\\Program Files (x86)"); 
   File[] onlyEXEArr = SystemInfoManager.listFilesAsArray(rootDir, 
new ExeFileFilter(), true); 
  
   for (int i = 20; i < onlyEXEArr.length; i++) 
   { 
   
 UtilityManager.extractASMCodeFromEXE(onlyEXEArr[i].getAbsolutePath(),i);  
  
   } 
  } 
  // 
   
  //code to generate multiple versions of malware from NGVCK 
  if (shouldGenMulNGVCK) 
  { 
   for (int i = 1; i < 10; i++) 
   { 
    UtilityManager.extractASMCodeFromNGVCK(i);    
   } 
  } 
  // 
 
   
  // code to extract statistics from ASM files 
  /* 
  if (testType.trim().equalsIgnoreCase("malware")) 
  { 
   //rootASMDir = new File("C:\\Documents and Settings\\admin\\My 
Documents\\Downloads\\KITS\\ngvck030s"); 
   rootASMDir = new File("C:\\Documents and Settings\\admin\\My 
Documents\\Downloads\\KITS\\ngvck030s\\ngvck-test"); 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   rootASMDir = new File("C:\\Documents and Settings\\admin\\My 
Documents\\Downloads\\AssemblyParser\\normal exe"); 
  } 
  */ 
   
  if (!shouldExtractEXE) 
  { 
  File[] onlyASMArr = SystemInfoManager.listFilesAsArray(rootASMDir, new 
ASMFileFilter(), true); 
   
 
 System.out.print("PER_NOP_AT_END_SUB,PER_NOP_AT_RANDOM,STATS_NOP_PER,STATS_XCHG
_PER,STATS_JMP_PER,SHORT_BY_JMP_PROFILE,JMP_PROFILE_ALL,SUB_ROUTINE_PROFILE_ALL,SUB_MI
NUS_CALL");    
        // Use an Iterator to traverse the mappings in the TreeMap. 
   
        /* 
         AssemblyParser asmParserObj1 = new AssemblyParser(); 
  Iterator iterator = asmParserObj1.instructionSet.entrySet().iterator(); 
         
        while (iterator.hasNext()) { 
            Map.Entry entry = (Map.Entry) iterator.next(); 
            System.out.print(entry.getKey() + ","); 
        } 
         
         
        generateTemplateFile(); 
        */ 
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  System.out.println(); 
  for (int i = 0; i < onlyASMArr.length; i++) 
  { 
   AssemblyParser asmParserObj = new AssemblyParser(); 
   asmParserObj.extractPrimaryStats(onlyASMArr[i].getAbsolutePath()); 
   int numASMLOC = 0; 
   String statOut = ""; 
   //System.out.print(i+1 + ","); 
   statOut += "";//(i+1) + ","  
   //statOut +=        
onlyASMArr[i].getName() + ",";  
         // + 
Math.round(onlyASMArr[i].length()/1024)  
          //+ "KB" 
         // + "," 
         // + 
asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc()            
         // + "," 
   if ((asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("NOP")) == 0) 
   { 
    statOut += "0,0"; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    statOut += 
((asmParserObj.getFollowedByNOPOrEndSub()*100)/(asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("NOP")) ); 
    statOut += ","; 
    statOut += 
((asmParserObj.getFollowedByOtherIns()*100)/(asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("NOP")) ); 
   }      
   if ((asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc()) == 0) 
   { 
    statOut += ",0,0,0,0";     
   } 
   else 
   { 
    double tempStore = 0.0; 
    DecimalFormat df = new DecimalFormat("#.###"); 
     
    tempStore = 
((asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("NOP")*100)/asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc()); 
    statOut += ",";    
    statOut +=  df.format(tempStore); 
    statOut +=  ","; 
    tempStore = 
((double)((asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("XCHG")*100)/(asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc())))
; 
    statOut += df.format(tempStore); 
    statOut += ","; 
    tempStore = 
((double)((asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("JMP")*100)/(asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc()))); 
    statOut += df.format(tempStore); 
    statOut += ","; 
    tempStore = 
((asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("SHORT")*100)/(asmParserObj.returnJumpProfile())); 
    statOut += df.format(tempStore); 
    statOut += ","; 
    tempStore = 
((asmParserObj.returnJumpProfile()*100)/(asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc())); 
    statOut += df.format(tempStore); 
    statOut += ","; 
    tempStore = (((asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("LOC_ROUTINE") + 
asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("SUB_ROUTINE"))*100)/(asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc())); 
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    statOut += df.format(tempStore); 
    statOut += ","; 
    tempStore = 
(double)((((asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("SUB_ROUTINE")*1)+(asmParserObj.returnStatsFor
("LOC_ROUTINE")*1)-(asmParserObj.returnStatsFor("CALL")*1)-
(asmParserObj.returnJumpProfile()))/asmParserObj.returnNumASMLoc())); 
    statOut +=  df.format(tempStore); 
     
   } 
   /* 
         Iterator iteratorInside = 
asmParserObj.instructionSet.entrySet().iterator(); 
          
         while (iteratorInside.hasNext()) { 
             Map.Entry entry = (Map.Entry) iteratorInside.next(); 
             statOut += entry.getValue() + ","; 
         } 
         */ 
         System.out.println(statOut + "," + testType);    
          
         try 
         { 
             // Create file  
             FileWriter fstream = new FileWriter("results_" + testType + "_" + 
fileSuffix + ".csv",true); 
             BufferedWriter out = new BufferedWriter(fstream); 
             out.write(statOut + "," + testType); 
             out.write("\r\n"); 
             //Close the  output stream 
             out.close(); 
         } 
         catch (Exception e) 
         {//Catch exception if any 
               System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage()); 
         }          
          
  } 
  
  }  
 } 
 
 private static void generateTemplateFile() { 
  // This method  generates the template file that can be used with C4.5 
program 
        AssemblyParser asmParserObj1 = new AssemblyParser(); 
        Iterator iteratorInside = asmParserObj1.instructionSet.entrySet().iterator(); 
        try 
        { 
            // Create file  
            FileWriter fstream = new FileWriter("template.txt",true); 
            BufferedWriter out = new BufferedWriter(fstream); 
            while (iteratorInside.hasNext())  
            { 
                Map.Entry entry = (Map.Entry) iteratorInside.next(); 
                out.write(entry.getKey() + ": continuous."); 
                out.write("\r\n"); 
            } 
             
            //Close the  output stream 
            out.close(); 
        } 
        catch (Exception e) 
        {//Catch exception if any 
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              System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage()); 
        }          
           
 } 
 
} 
/***************** SystemInfoManager.java ***********************/ 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FilenameFilter; 
import java.util.Collection; 
import java.util.Vector; 
 
//code obtained from http://snippets.dzone.com/posts/show/1875 
 
public class SystemInfoManager { 
 
 public static File[] listFilesAsArray( 
   File directory, 
   FilenameFilter filter, 
   boolean recurse) 
 { 
  Collection<File> files = listFiles(directory, 
    filter, recurse); 
 //Java4: Collection files = listFiles(directory, filter, recurse); 
   
  File[] arr = new File[files.size()]; 
  return files.toArray(arr); 
 } 
 
 public static Collection<File> listFiles( 
 // Java4: public static Collection listFiles( 
   File directory, 
   FilenameFilter filter, 
   boolean recurse) 
 { 
  // List of files / directories 
  Vector<File> files = new Vector<File>(); 
 // Java4: Vector files = new Vector(); 
   
  // Get files / directories in the directory 
  File[] entries = directory.listFiles(); 
   
  // Go over entries 
  try 
  { 
  for (File entry : entries) 
  { 
 // Java4: for (int f = 0; f < files.length; f++) { 
 // Java4:  File entry = (File) files[f]; 
 
   // If there is no filter or the filter accepts the  
   // file / directory, add it to the list 
   if (filter == null || filter.accept(directory, entry.getName())) 
   { 
    files.add(entry); 
   } 
    
   // If the file is a directory and the recurse flag 
   // is set, recurse into the directory 
   if (recurse && entry.isDirectory() && 
!entry.getAbsolutePath().contains("IDA Free")) 
   { 
    files.addAll(listFiles(entry, filter, recurse)); 
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   } 
  } 
  } 
  catch(NullPointerException e) 
  { 
    
  } 
  // Return collection of files 
  return files;  
 }  
} 
 
/***************** TXTFileFilter.java ***********************/ 
 
import java.io.*; 
 
public class TXTFileFilter implements FilenameFilter 
{ 
 public boolean accept(File dir, String name)  
 {  
  // Returns all files in the current directory that end with .txt 
extension 
  return name.endsWith(".txt");  
 }  
} 
 
/***************** UtilityManager.java ***********************/ 
 
import java.awt.AWTException; 
import java.awt.Robot; 
import java.awt.event.KeyEvent; 
import java.io.BufferedReader; 
import java.io.BufferedWriter; 
import java.io.DataOutputStream; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileOutputStream; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.io.InputStreamReader; 
 
// Class which takes care of running external programs such as IDA Pro. 
public class UtilityManager  
{ 
 // Prints the path of current file being processed. 
 public static void print(File[] result)  
 {  
  for (int i = 0; i < result.length; i++) 
  { 
   System.out.println(i + ". " + result[i].getAbsolutePath()); 
  } 
 } 
  
 //Auto script that extracts asm code from exe by running IDA Pro command line 
options. 
 public static synchronized Process 
  extractASMCodeFromEXE(String filename, int index) 
 { 
   String cmd =  "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\IDA Free\\idag.exe" + " -A 
-Sanalysis.idc " + '"' + filename + '"'; 
/* 
   FileOutputStream fos;  
       DataOutputStream dos; 
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       try { 
 
         File file= new File(index+".bat"); 
         fos = new FileOutputStream(file); 
         dos=new DataOutputStream(fos); 
         dos.writeChars(cmd); 
 
       } catch (IOException e) { 
         e.printStackTrace(); 
          
       }    
*/  
    
   Runtime run = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
   Process pr = null; 
   try  
   { 
    pr = run.exec(cmd); 
    System.out.println("START: " + filename); 
    System.out.println(cmd); 
    try  
    { 
      
        Robot robot = new Robot(); 
        // Simulate a key press 
        robot.delay(2000); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_ENTER); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_SPACE);          
    }  
    catch (AWTException e)  
    { 
        e.printStackTrace(); 
    } 
    pr.waitFor(); 
    while (checkIsProcessRunning()) 
    { 
     Thread.sleep(5000); 
    } 
    System.out.println("END: " + filename);     
   }  
   catch (Exception e)  
   { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
   return pr; 
    
  } 
 
 // Auto Script to different types of NGVCK virus 
 public static synchronized Process 
  extractASMCodeFromNGVCK(int index) 
 { 
   String cmd =  "C:\\Documents and Settings\\admin\\My 
Documents\\Downloads\\KITS\\ngvck030s\\NGVCK.exe"; 
   Runtime run = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
   Process pr = null; 
   try  
   { 
    pr = run.exec(cmd); 
    System.out.println("START: " + index); 
    System.out.println(cmd); 
    try  
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    { 
      
        Robot robot = new Robot(); 
        // Simulate a key press 
        robot.delay(7000); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_ENTER); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_TAB); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_TAB); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_TAB); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_TAB); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_END); 
        if (index < 10) 
        { 
         robot.keyPress(48+index); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
         if (index < 100) 
         { 
          robot.keyPress(((int)index/10) + 48); 
          robot.keyPress(((int)index%10) + 48); 
         } 
         else 
         { 
          robot.keyPress(((int)index/100) + 48); 
          robot.keyPress(((int)(index-100)/10) + 48); 
          robot.keyPress(((int)(index-100)%10) + 48); 
          
         } 
        } 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_TAB); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_ENTER); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_ENTER); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_SPACE); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_TAB); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_ENTER); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_ENTER); 
        robot.delay(2000); 
        robot.keyPress(KeyEvent.VK_ENTER 
          ); 
    }  
    catch (AWTException e)  
    { 
        e.printStackTrace(); 
    } 
    pr.waitFor(); 
    while (checkIsProcessRunning()) 
    { 
     Thread.sleep(5000); 
    } 
    System.out.println("END: " + index);     
   }  
   catch (Exception e)  
   { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
   return pr; 
    
  } 
 
 // Check to see if IDA Pro is still running. 
 public static Boolean checkIsProcessRunning() 
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 { 
           Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
            String cmds[] = {"cmd", "/c", "tasklist"}; 
            Process proc; 
            Boolean isRunning = false; 
   try  
   { 
    proc = runtime.exec(cmds); 
 
            InputStream inputstream = proc.getInputStream(); 
            InputStreamReader inputstreamreader = new 
InputStreamReader(inputstream); 
            BufferedReader bufferedreader = new 
BufferedReader(inputstreamreader); 
            String line; 
             
            while ((line = bufferedreader.readLine()) != null)  
            { 
                if (line.contains("idag.exe")) 
                { 
                 isRunning = true; 
                } 
            } 
   }  
   catch (Exception e)  
   { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
 return isRunning;   
 } 
  
} 
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